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I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2018, Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic
of China (“China” or “PRC”) and the General Secretary of the Chinese
* Program Officer, Women’s Rights Program, Open Society Foundations (previously East
Asia Program Officer). Special thanks to the Fordham International Law Journal for their
tremendous efforts in organizing a Symposium on an important topic on human rights in China
and to the staff editors for their work on this Article.
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Communist Party (“CCP” or “the Party”), was elevated to highest
echelons of political power. 1 Successfully consolidating power to an
unprecedented level since Deng Xiaopeng and Mao Zedong, Xi is now
the “core leader” of a centralized system geared towards implementing
his vision for China’s future. 2 “Xi Jinping Thought” 3 is now enshrined
in the CCP’s constitution, and was written into the PRC Constitution
itself after a March 11, 2018 vote by China’s National People’s
Congress. 4 At the same time, the national legislature voted
overwhelmingly to amend the PRC Constitution to abolish term limits
on the presidency. 5
Having brought ill-disciplined Party cadres to heel through his
ambitious (and ruthless) anti-corruption campaign 6 Xi is now
determined to re-establish Party authority over virtually every aspect
of Chinese life, including the media, universities, schools, key cultural
institutions, corporations, and the military, and even law firms—
reiterating at the 19th Party Congress that “the Party is the leader of

1. Matt Schrader, In A Fortnight: Xi’s Other Amendments, JAMESTOWN F. (Mar. 12, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://jamestown.org/program/xis-other-amendments/ (describing the twenty-one
constitutional amendments proposed during the thirteenth National Party Congress in March
2018 as “the largest rewriting of the PRC Constitution since its wholesale revision in 1982” and
that the “proposed revisions . . . signal the extent to which Xi Jinping has consolidated power”).
2. Shi Jiangtao, Congress concludes with President Xi Jinping as undisputed ‘core’ leader,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 25, 2017, 5:47 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2116830/congress-concludes-xi-undisputed-core-leader [https://perma
.cc/UT9E-NUGB].
3. The full name of Xi Jinping’s ideological and policy agenda is “Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era.” The elevation of Xi Jinping’s theoretical
contributions to the CCP’s constitution elevates him to the level of Deng Xiaoping and Mao
Zedong. See Peter Wood, CCP Revises Constitution For a “New Era” (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:02 PM),
JAMESTOWN F., https://jamestown.org/program/ccp-revises-constitution-new-era/ [https://
perma.cc/NF46-26MX] (analyzing Xi Jinping’s agenda).
4. Lu Hui, China Focus: China’s national legislature adopts landmark constitutional
amendment, XINHUA (Mar. 11, 2018, 11:19 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201803/11/c_137032165.htm [https://perma.cc/6C38-6DGU].
5. Chris Buckley & Steven Lee Myers, China’s Legislature Blesses Xi’s Indefinite Rule.
It was 2,958 to 2, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/
asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html.
6. See China anti-graft drive sees 100 top officials tried in five years, HONG KONG FREE
PRESS (Mar. 10, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/03/10/china-anti-graftdrive-sees-100-top-officials-tried-five-years/ [https://perma.cc/46D3-B93W]; Choi Chi-yuk, Xi
Jinping’s anti-graft drive has caught so many officials that Beijing’s elite prison is running out
of cells, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 21, 2018, 11:56 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/policies-politics/article/2133251/xi-jinpings-anti-graft-drive-has-caught-so-many
[https://perma.cc/DQW3-EQWD].
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everything.” 7 In March 2018, the National Party Congress announced
plans for a “revolutionary” restructuring of Chinese government
structures, 8 one which is intended to reassert the Party’s leadership
over all government agencies. 9 Most pertinently, the Supreme People’s
Court and Procuratorate will be subject to the newly created, powerful
National Supervision Commission, 10 expanding the Party’s powers
over China’s judiciary. 11
This centralization of power is driven by the desire for ideological
control and the belief that such discipline is necessary for the
legitimacy of the CCP’s continued rule in China. 12 There is an intense
crackdown—both within the government 13 and across Chinese civil
society—on those who challenge (or are perceived to challenge) Xi
Jinping’s vision of a rejuvenated Chinese nation with the Party at its

7. Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Thought – the Communist Party’s tighter grip on China in 16
characters, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 25, 2017) http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-thought-communist-partys-tighter-grip-china
[https://perma.cc/KWV3-WUGW] (quoting Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Party
Congress, in which he said, “Government, military, society and schools, north, south, east and
west – the party leads them all.”).
8. China’s reform of Party, state institutions revolutionary: senior official, XINHUA (Mar.
13, 2018, 4:23 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/13/c_137036286.htm
[https://perma.cc/M5QS-NWYG].
9. Id. (paraphrasing Liu He, a top official, who noted that “[a] primary task of deepening
reform of the Party and state institutions is to strengthen the CPC’s leadership in every sector”).
10. Josephine Ma, Revealed: the far-reaching powers of China’s new super anticorruption
agency, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 13, 2018, 11:46 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/policies-politics/article/2136949/far-reaching-powers-chinas-new-super-anticorruption [https://perma.cc/Y3K7-36V3].
11. See Mercy A. Kuo, China’s Detention Law: CCP Curbs Courts, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb.
21, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-detention-law-ccp-curbs-courts/ [https://
perma.cc/5UHD-Y6PU] (analyzing in detail the possible impacts of the National Supervision
Law, especially regarding the extension of extralegal detentions and the limits of criminal
procedure protections for suspects).
12. See Jun Mai, Xi Jinping is changing the constitution, but what’s his endgame? SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/
article/2136676/xi-jinping-changing-constitution-whats-his-endgame? [https://perma.cc/67X4B5MM].
13. Aside from the wide-ranging anti-corruption investigations that have cowed other
officials, experts also point to the marginalization of rival political factions within the Party
structure, the demotions of those who “do not see eye to eye with Xi” and heightened scrutiny
of business interests of those deemed insufficiently loyal. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Xi Jinping
Steers China back to the Days of Mao Zedong, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:58
PM), https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-steers-china-back-days-mao-zedong/ [https://
perma.cc/T5WW-M759] (arguing that personnel changes demonstrate “[t]hat Xi is determined
to run China in his own mold—and to banish all voices of opposition”).
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core and himself at its helm. 14 In practice, this aggressive assertion of
power over Chinese society is being pushed not only through the use
of laws and regulations to govern behavior, 15 but also at the level of
values promotion and the intentional shaping of historical and cultural
narratives – that is, winning hearts and minds.
It is not a coincidence that human rights lawyers and NGO
activists working on rights issues are the hardest hit in the broad
crackdown against Chinese civil society. 16 This Article argues that
fundamentally this is a sharp attack to deny the political and civic space
needed for the contestation of ideas, and to suppress those that dare to
reveal human rights abuses – that is, those that reveal “negative stories”
about China that challenge the positive image that the government is
seeking to project. Nor is it a coincidence that Xi’s vision of global
governance under Chinese leadership involves pushing the concept of
“a people-centered development philosophy” as an alternative model
to the international human rights legal system underpinned by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 17 This Article argues that such
moves are a serious attempt to move the battlegrounds for rights
lawyering and rights promotion away from the legal system and the
policy-making arena, into the sphere of public opinion, which can be
14. See discussion infra Part I, III.
15. See discussion of laws and regulations infra Part III.
16. More than 300 lawyers and activists were affected by a nationwide crackdown on July
9, 2015; by mid-2018, most of the so-called “709” lawyers and activists who were indicted have
been sentenced, with one final lawyer, Wang Quanzhang, awaiting his trial almost three years
after being disappeared. China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, “709 Crackdown: Latest
Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 17 May 2018,” http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/
content/%E3%80%90%E2%80%9C709-crackdown%E2%80%9D%E3%80%91-latest-dataand-development-cases-1800-17-may-2018 [https://perma.cc/9GN2-UJRU]. After almost two
years of secret detention, Wu Gan, who did not admit wrongdoing, was sentenced to eight years
on charges of subversion; and Xie Yang, who pleaded guilty to subversion charges in May 2017,
was retried but escaped a prison sentence despite his “explosive account of being tortured, beaten
and threatened by interrogators.” See Benjamin Haas, Chinese human rights activist jailed eight
years
for
subversion,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
25,
2017,
11:37
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/26/chinese-human-rights-lawyer-jailed-foreight-years-for-subversion [https://perma.cc/563D-FFUV]. See also China human rights lawyer
Xie
Yang
‘admits
being
brainwashed,’
BBC NEWS,
(May
8,
2017)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39843680
[https://perma.cc/3FNN-VA9T]
(explaining how the “709 crackdown” got its name).
17. See Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's congratulatory message to South-South
Human Rights Forum, XINHUA (Dec. 7, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-12/07/c_136808493.htm [https://perma.cc/EQ9W-LK2U]; see also Charlotte
Gao, China Promotes Human Rights ‘With Chinese Characteristics,’ THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 12,
2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-promotes-human-rights-with-chinesecharacteristics/ [https://perma.cc/62PR-4VKW].
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more comprehensively managed by a well-oiled media management
infrastructure and increasingly strict media censorship laws.
This Article will examine the broader legal, regulatory and social
context within which rights lawyering in China occurs, especially as it
affects the political and civic space within which values are promoted
and narratives are shaped. It begins by contextualizing the emergence
of rights lawyering in the early 2000s, looking at several factors that
supported the mobilization of lawyers and other activists advocating
for different kinds of human rights through the Chinese legal system.
It then turns to recent trends in the political and legal frameworks that
influence the space for rights lawyering, starting with an analysis of
Xi’s vision for a new era in China’s history, and the shift from winning
within the courts to shaping the narrative in the public opinion sphere.
Finally, this Article examines the possible impact of these shifts on the
rights lawyering and grassroots mobilization in the areas of LGBTQ
rights and women’s rights.
II. RIGHTS LAWYERING AND LEGAL MOBILIZATION IN
CONTEXT
Scholarship about lawyers as a profession in China, civil society
activism and grassroots mobilization has flourished even as the
political environment for the subjects of such scholarship is rapidly
changing. Experts have studied Chinese lawyers’ work methodologies,
their daily experiences in courts, scrutinized constitutional litigation
cases, and analyzed how Chinese lawyers and law firms are regulated.18
A body of scholarship around what I would collectively call “rights
lawyering” is also developing, with several seminal works in recent
years that look closely at the motivations and experiences of different
groups of lawyers. Scholars have adopted different taxonomies of the
legal profession 19 and examined several institutional and social factors
18. See Terence C. Halliday & Sida Liu, Birth of a Liberal Moment? Looking through a
OneWay Mirror at Lawyers’ Defense of Criminal Defendants in China in FIGHTING FOR
POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 65-107 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the use of Article 306 of
the 1997 PRC Criminal Law to detain, prosecute or convict lawyers under the crime of “lawyer’s
perjury” and its retaliatory use in practice against defense lawyers).
19. See, e.g., EVA PILS, CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND
RESISTANCE (2014) (analyzing the experiences of human rights lawyers in Chinese law and
politics); SIDA LIU & TERENCE HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF
LAWYERS AT WORK 6-7 (2016) (analyzing criminal defense lawyers in China and their methods
of working). Liu and Halliday present a taxonomy of lawyers including: progressive elites,
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for the emergence of lawyers and other rights advocates who are
“willing[] and ab[le] . . . to stand out, speak out, and act out in
addressing public policy issues through litigation.” 20 These taxonomies
are not mutually exclusive, because they seek to categorize the
evolving motivations, conduct, cases, strategies of lawyers who
interact with, influence, and are influenced by, their peers and their
external environment. Moreover, while some lawyers may proactively
identify themselves with certain groups of lawyers (i.e. human rights
lawyers, 21 weiquan [ 维 权 rights-protection or rights defense]
lawyers, 22 “die-hard” lawyers, 23 or public interest lawyers) as a means
of establishing their own networks, others adopt similar approaches or
share similar ideals but eschew labels to mitigate risk. While a full
analysis of these different categories (both ascribed and self-perceived)
is beyond the scope of this Article, I use “rights lawyering” to
encompass a wide range of lawyering activities with several shared
characteristics. First, it involves legal advocacy focusing on interests
that are broader than those of an individual case or the interests of an
pragmatic brokers, political activists, and routine practitioners. For Chinese criminal defense
lawyers, they further differentiate the category of political activists into two types: notable
activists (referring to a small group of lawyers that “proactively seek out politically sensitive
cases and challenge arbitrary state power”) and grassroots activists (referring to “ordinary
lawyers all over China who possess politically liberal values and motivations but do not mobilize
collectively due to unfavorable structural constraints . . . [but] use their everyday . . . work to
pursue substantive legal-political goals of protecting the basic legal rights of citizens through
practices of proceduralism”). Id. at 6-7.
20. See Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, The Development of Public Interest Litigation in
China, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 1 (Po Jen Yap et al. eds., Routledge 2010)
(defining public interest lawyering).
21. Note that the terms used by scholars to label Chinese lawyers can be different from
how they perceived or organized themselves. For example, Eva Pils uses “human rights lawyer”
and “rights lawyer” interchangeably, although her work primarily focused on weiquan lawyers.
See Bochen Han, China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Political Resistance and the Law, THE
DIPLOMAT (Feb. 11, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-human-rights-lawyerspolitical-resistance-and-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/L3M3-B5J2].
22. See generally Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering
in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering, 59 THE CHINA J.
111, 111-127, (2008) (offering a basic taxonomy classifying weiquan lawyering as moderate,
critical and radical based on tactics and perceptions of the use of law); Teng Biao, Rights
Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan), 2012/3 CHINA
PERSP. 29, 29-41 (2012) (discussing the rights defense movement [ 维 权 运 动 weiquan
yundong]).
23. Lawyers who identify as being part of the “diehard faction” (死磕 派 sikepai) take
their name from a northern slang term roughly translated “to fight to the bitter end.” See Alexa
Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 16,
2014, 6:30 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehardcriminal-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/6TBN-G5RP].
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immediate client. 24 Second, it involves the use of legal tools—and
sometimes non-legal tools—to push for reforms of the existing Chinese
legal and policy framework to improve the protection and promotion
of individuals’ rights, especially those from marginalized
communities. 25
Several important factors contributed to the emergence of rights
lawyering and the ability of lawyers of different stripes to mobilize.
One important structural factor is the rapid proliferation of laws and
regulations in the rebuilding of China’s legal system from 1978
onwards and the accompanying professionalization of lawyers. 26 The
1996 PRC Lawyers Law 27 officially marked the privatization of the
legal profession, moving away from lawyers being state legal workers
to lawyers with professional identity and ethics. 28 One consequence of
the building of the Chinese socialist legal system 29 is that “law has
become an important aspect of state ideology and of popular
consciousness.” 30 The enshrinement of “rule of law” and “human
rights” in the 2004 amendment of the PRC Constitution further
entrenched these concepts in popular discourse, 31 and provided space
for rights defense activists. 32 Rule of law discourse also offered
opportunities for cross-cultural exchange of ideas about the role of law
within a society, including the role of China’s constitution and ideas
related to individual civil rights. 33

24. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 111-12.
25. See Rachel E. Stern, Activist Lawyers in Post-Tiananmen China, 42 Law & Soc. Inq.
234-51 (2017), 237-40 (discussing the traditions that what she calls activist lawyers point to as
motivational factors for their push for reforms).
26. Jerome Cohen, Keynote: An Introduction to Law in China, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 393, 399
(2007) (“I don’t know of another national elite in history that has done more to produce
legislation, regulations, guidance and other norms in so short a time.”)
27. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (adopted by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997).
28. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 124.
29 . See generally Establishment of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese
Characteristics, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER. http://www.china.org.cn/
government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738846.htm [https://perma.cc/RT5Y-EV2G]
(providing an authoritative explanation of the government’s position on the historical context of
the development of the contemporary Chinese legal system).
30. Benjamin L. Liebman, Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17,
19 (2009).
31. See Fu & Cullen , supra note 22, at 123.
32 . See Teng, supra note 22, at 30 (“Rule of law discourse coupled with laws and
regulations provided space for rights defence activists.”)
33. Id.
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Similarly, this process opened up political space for
entrepreneurship in governance and legal reforms, allowing lawyers to
play a role in demonstrating gaps in the legal framework and suggest
possibility of reform. Liu and Halliday note that “lawyers who strive
for basic legal freedoms often insist that this is only possible if state
power itself is fractured, most importantly through some independence
or autonomy of the judiciary, from control by the monarchy, the
military, one-party leaders, or an executive branch of government,
including the police—the domestic coercive arm of government
itself.” 34 Moreover, the proliferation of new laws also generated more
instances where the differences in the law in text and the law in practice
created opportunities for lawyers and their clients to hold government
officials accountable to legal rhetoric. 35 Experimentation was seen as
facilitative of state interests in legal reform, not just in the promulgation
of new laws at the local levels, but also in the “willingness of courts
and local governments to take actions that at times contradict national
rules or laws.” 36 Therein lies opportunities for lawyers to bring new
ideas to courts or legislators in order to expand or concretize certain
rights.
The Reform Era also saw vibrant civil society growth, with
“[s]pace for civil activity enlarged by development of the market
economy.” 37 Civil society activism helped to increase the “rights
awareness of aggrieved individuals and their readiness to assert their
rights,” 38 broadening the pool of plaintiffs for lawyers, while lawyers’
engagement with NGOs working with marginalized communities also
supported mutually beneficial relationships and increased innovation
in how to engage with the state. 39 Another aspect of this was the space
within the legal academy for law professors and lawyers to shape public
discourse about law; as Fu and Cullen note: “Academic lawyers have

34. LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19, at 4.
35. Fu and Cullen note that “inconsistency between legal rights and their routine violation
in practice creates opportunities in the political and legal system for weiquan to develop.” Fu &
Cullen, supra note 22, at 123 (citing KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE
IN RURAL CHINA (2006)).
36. Liebman, supra note 30, at 21.
37. Teng, supra note 22, at 30.
38. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 125.
39. Id. at 124.
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been crucial in promoting the concept of the constitutional and legal
protections of rights.” 40
A relatively open media landscape, including through internet
news platforms, was also a contributing factor. With journalists and
editors who are willing and able to write and publish on social justice
issues, and legal news increasing in popularity, 41 lawyers were able to
use media attention as a way to influence public opinion on a particular
case or a particular topic—and perhaps even encourage government
intervention in favor of their clients or their clients’ communities. 42
Technological advancements, especially on social media
platforms, allow for greater ease of communications across China and,
with it, the spread of legal knowledge. 43 The exponential growth in
Internet users and the use of mobile technology in China also increased
the ability of lawyers to organize themselves—to build connections
with other like-minded lawyers outside the bounds of geography, to
discuss cases and legal strategies, and to broadcast their opinions 44—
both in furtherance of cases and for community mobilization should an
activist/lawyer face threats. Social media is particularly important for
activist lawyers, as it offers a platform for lawyers to take their opinions
and legal arguments to the general public, therefore bypassing
traditional media outlets (newspapers or television reporting) that is
heavily regulated. 45
Scholars often use political positioning to describe lawyers’
motivations, decision-making and conduct—that is, differentiating
40. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 113-14 (noting that law schools were particularly
supportive practice sites for weiquan lawyering and noting leading weiquan lawyers that were
professors whose “university position allows them the freedom, financial and otherwise, to play
an active role in weiquan lawyering,” including He Weifang, Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao and Fan
Yafeng from the Law Institute, China Academy of Social Sciences, Zhou Wei from Sichuan
University).
41 . LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19 at 71 (describing a “notable trend of
commercialization in the Chinese media . . . legal news, as well as other social news, has become
a popular section for many newspapers and TV programs.”)
42. Id. at 72.
43. See Liebman, supra note 30, at 21 (“The actions of procurators, lawyers, and ordinary
citizens are also influenced by knowledge of legal developments elsewhere in China.”)
44. See, e.g., LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 19, at 74 (“For highly sensitive cases . . . on
which no official Chinese media would report, some notable activists in Beijing sometimes use
Internet blogs and microblogs or go directly to the international media . . . WeChat groups,
which are more private than blogs and microblogs, have also become a popular tool for activist
lawyers to provide support for like-minded colleagues in recent years.”)
45. See id. at 75, 87 (“Whenever there is an influential legal case, they speak collectively
through the Internet using social media to voice their opinions to the public sphere.”)
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between those who adopt “moderate” political stances (i.e. not openly
critical of the Chinese government), and those more “radical” lawyers
willing to challenge the government and take on cases that other
lawyers may consider to be “off limits because they are . . . political
questions that are too important and sensitive for the law to decide.”46
These political calculations—and the ability to mitigate risks—are
extremely important to lawyers’ ability to win their cases, continue
their rights advocacy, and mobilize support without facing government
reprisal, especially because the personal costs of being attacked by the
government are extremely high. 47
Yet what happens when the lines of what is, and what is not,
political shifts?
III. THE RESHAPING OF RIGHTS AND LAW IN XI’S CHINA
Under the Xi administration, previous calculations of political
acceptability and risks shifted dramatically, while methods of
government repression are changing. While repression of civil society
activism and rights lawyering was always part of the landscape under
the Hu Jintao administration, Xi’s rise has “ushered in a campaign of
repression against civil society characterized by national security
rhetoric, the criminalization of threatening activism, and proactive
repression.” 48 Xi continues to preside over the most wide-ranging and
sustained attack on civil society that China has seen since the
Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989 as the state “aggressively
police[s] boundary pushers.” 49 Rights-based NGOs suffered intense
harassment, some forced to close their doors altogether, others to
tamper down their activities or to continue to work underground. 50
46. Fu & Cullen, supra note 20, at 2 (“Radical lawyers are willing to take on politically
sensitive cases, which the government regards as off limits, ready to mobilize media and NGOs,
and prepared to work with foreign entities.”)
47. See Liu & Halliday supra note 19, at 90 (“Since the zealous advocacy of activist
lawyers can readily be construed as acts of political subversion, the defenders of the Party-state
deploy an array of weapons in their armories to silence, quash, domesticate, marginalize, isolate,
or exile these stubborn defenders of the weak. The personal costs of rights advocacy and defense
have been widely reported in the media and analyzed by scholars . . . namely, professional
sanctions, state security repression, and violence of the black mafia.”)
48. Diana Fu & Greg Distelhorst, Grassroots Participation and Repression under Hu
Jintao and Xi Jinping, 79 THE CHINA J. 100, 104 (2018).
49. Id. at 100.
50. See generally Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Repression & Resilience: Annual
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (Feb. 2018) (presenting a full
accounting of government actions against human rights activists in 2017).
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Activists have been detained in record numbers: a large-scale,
coordinated attack on human rights lawyers and activists starting on
July 9, 2015 (now known as the “709” crackdown) targeted more than
300 rights lawyers and activists across the country. 51
A.

Xi’s China: Personalization of Power and Impact on Civil
Society

The personalization of power under Xi Jinping has not only
changed the structure of the Chinese government, it has also
significantly curtailed the space for diverse ideas and discourse. Xi
Jinping “has made himself the chairman of everything” 52 and injected
party control into areas that were relatively independent for the last two
decades. For example, the reintroduction of party cells into many
different sectors – including private companies, schools at all levels53
and even law firms—is intended to ensure that discipline and
monitoring is done from the inside. Moreover, the merger of party and
state institutions 54 seeks to close structural gaps between central and
local governments so that central Party prerogatives and state
governance are more aligned. 55 This will likely reduce the space for
rights lawyers to exploit opportunities that derive from the “de facto
pluralistic nature of today’s OPS [one party state].” 56
There is also increased control of different actors who offer
alternative poles of influence, in part to institute ideological control and
to ensure that the Party leads reform efforts and shapes narratives about
contemporary and historical events. It is well-documented that
universities are under tight political control, and that professors—once
seen to be relatively insulated from political reprisal because of social
51. Alex W. Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged Human Rights Lawyers, THE N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonelycrusade-of-chinas-human-rights-lawyers.html.
52. Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21737543-unhappiness-china-palpable-xi-jinpingdecides-abolish-presidential-term-limits [https://perma.cc/92ZX-RPLQ].
53. See Gan, supra note 7.
54. Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, supra note 52 (discussing
constitutional revisions that highlight the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party in the
government, noting that “[p]arty and state could hardly become more amalgamated”).
55. Tian Feliong, Beyond term limits: China’s new constitution is written for a nation on
the rise, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 23, 2018, 3:58 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2138542/beyond-term-limits-chinasnew-constitution-written-nation [https://perma.cc/JA5V-R9WS].
56. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126.
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prestige and vestiges of academic freedom—are subject to restrictions
on expressing their views and what they can teach in class. 57 Media
outlets, once a source of influence in public affairs, have been
drastically curtailed and the ranks of journalists diminished as well.58
As for the non-governmental and charities sector, the Charity Law and
the Foreign NGO Management Law have, in effect, combined to
channel resources towards sectors that are officially sanctioned and
away from rights-based advocacy. 59
B.

Role of Law and Lawyers in Xi’s China

Although rights lawyers often emphasize law as a tool of reform,
law can also be a tool of oppression and repression. In recent years, the
high-octane push for law-making to improve the socialist legal system
with Chinese characteristics 60 also included a dragnet of laws aimed at
preventing social disruption, regulating behavior and punishing those
who challenge government prerogative. 61 The March 2018
constitutional amendments have added a new phrase “socialist rule by
law” to the CCP’s governing philosophy—moving away from “rule of
law” language to “rule by law” also dispenses with the veneer of
judicial independence, and marking a return to the Marxist/Leninist
view that “courts should be a tool of party control.” 62 This is also
57. Anthony Kuhn, In China, Scholars Are Being Punished Amid Growing Squeeze On
Public Expression, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/parallels/2017/10/10/553484924/in-china-scholars-are-being-punished-amid-growingsqueeze-on-public-expression [https://perma.cc/CB2U-W5NL].
58. Liz Tung, “Social media fills vacuum left by China’s ‘hollowed out’ press,” Columbia
Journalism Review (May 25, 2017) https://www.cjr.org/analysis/china-social-media-pressfreedom.php [https://perma.cc/7ZTV-UET4].
59 . Nuala Gathercole Lam, NGOs at a Crossroads, CHINA FILE (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.chinafile.com/ngo/latest/ngos-crossroads [https://perma.cc/VKL8-UPFC] (noting
“the current administration’s ‘re-centering’ of civil society around public service provision and
away from advocacy” and that the Chinese government “is walking a narrow path—
maneuvering public services into the hands of civil society organizations, while simultaneously
attempting to ensure they are not politicized by the situations their work brings them into contact
with”).
60. See Full Text: New Progress in the Legal Protection of Human Rights in China 2017,
XINHUA (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201712/15/c_136828822.htm [https://perma.cc/R7D3-UKXD].
61. Gan, supra note 7 (describing Xi’s governing philosophy as promoting confidence,
noting that “[s]uch confidence comes with a lower tolerance for different views. In his first term,
he sought to crush dissent, or what he calls ‘erroneous viewpoints,’ with a sweeping crackdown
on activists, rights lawyers and civil society as well as stringent censorship of the media and the
internet”).
62. Xi Jinping decides to abolish presidential term limits, supra note 52.
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particularly true, given the National Supervision Law, which brings the
courts under the Party’s supervision. The law’s jurisdiction now
includes all civil servants, regardless of party membership, therefore
extending investigative procedures of the Party and unlimited detention
procedures to millions non-Party members. 63
New regulations intended to manage lawyers 64 and law firms65
now require lawyers to “support the leadership” of the CCP and to
establish party branches in law firms. These regulations also seek to
control lawyers’ opinions, prohibiting them from speech that
challenges China’s political system or endangers national security. As
noted by Human Rights Watch,
The amended directives also impose vague and overbroad
restrictions on all lawyers’ right to freedom of expression.
Lawyers will now be prohibited from “inciting” or “organizing”
their clients and others to participate in sit-ins or demonstrations
that “disturb public order” or otherwise put pressure on the
authorities, even if those gatherings are peaceful. Lawyers may not
make “misleading” or “malicious” comments about any cases,
publish or sign joint letters, or gather “virtually” or in person to
“attack or slander” the judicial system. Lawyers are barred from
“gathering crowds to make a fuss,” insulting judicial officers,
“denying the nature of cults when the state has already determined
them as such,” or other behaviors that “disturb court order.” They
also cannot use the Internet and the media to “provoke discontent
against the Party and the state” or “instigate” people to file lawsuits
to “destabilize social stability.” 66

63. China detention law to roll back legal protections for suspects, THE FIN. TIMES,
[https://perma.
cc/W7ZV-ZBSW] (“The incursion of party authority into the civil state is a reversal of broader
reforms undertaken since the 1979s to carve out a sphere for professional civil government in
China.”)
64. Lawyers Practice Management Methods (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Sept.
18, 2016, effective Nov. 1, 2016) (China), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_
5113014.htm [https://perma.cc/V75A-FXQC].
65. Id.
66. See China: New Rules Gag Lawyers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2016, 7:55 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/25/china-new-rules-gag-lawyers [https://perma.cc/B6TXNKX9].
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C. Rights Discourse in Xi’s China
There is also a significant shift in Chinese governmental attitudes
towards international engagement, and particularly towards state
rhetoric about international ideas and values. Authorities are seeking to
combat undesirable ideological trends through limiting the influence of
so-called “Western ideas” (including universal values like human
rights, civil society and “the West’s view of media” 67) and increasing
control of how Chinese civil society actors engage with international
partners. The CCP has increased its rhetoric naming “foreign forces”
as major threats to China’s domestic stability, while accusing foreign
powers of attempts to undermine China’s rise. 68 It has branded those
who dare to question the CCP’s agenda as agents of foreign powers and
expanded legal definitions of “hostile groups” to include any group that
challenges the power of the CCP, China’s socialist system or the
Chinese government. 69 For example, in 2017, the Chinese government
broadened the Counter-Espionage Law to include conduct deemed
subversive or threatening to national security like the issuing of
information that harms China’s national security, or meeting with
individuals that harm national security 70 —activities which are not
traditionally deemed to be espionage. The Chinese government has also
made disrespect to state symbols (like the national flag and anthem) or
CCP heroes and leadership punishable offences. 71
67. See Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINAFILE (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.
chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation [https://perma.cc/53HE-6A4B] (Document 9 is
an internal CCP communique listing seven taboo subjects that posed political “perils,” declaring
that the promotion of civil society was being used as a “political tool” to “dismantle the ruling
party’s social foundation.”)
68. See Julia Makinen, China’s crackdown on dissent is described as the harshest in
decades, THE L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fgchina-crackdown-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/8TBT-Z533]; Zheping Huang, The
complete guide to China’s propaganda videos blaming the West for almost everything, QUARTZ
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://qz.com/751338/the-complete-guide-to-chinas-propaganda-videosblaming-the-west-for-almost-everything/ [https://perma.cc/XK8C-C6ER].
69 . See Nectar Gan, Beijing extends powers of state security agents under counterespionage law, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:19 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2123210/beijing-extends-powersstate-security-agents-under.
70. Counter-espionage rules stipulate exit, entry restrictions, XINHUANET.COM, (Dec. 6,
2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/06/c_136805751.htm.
71. For detailed discussion of the amendments to the Criminal Code and the establishment
of the National Anthem Law, see Wendy Zeldin, China/Hong Kong/Macau: Penalization of
Disrespect for National Anthem Under Tenth Criminal Code Amendment, Library oc Congress
Global Legal Monitor, (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/chinahongkongmacau-penalization-of-disrespect-for-national-anthem-under-tenth-criminal-code-
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At the same time, state-sponsored propaganda campaigns aimed
at bolstering Chinese government and CCP-authorized narratives have
been launched—looking not only at shaping narratives about Chinese
culture and history, but also contemporary events. Since 2015, the
Chinese authorities have launched an unprecedented campaign to shape
public opinion against human rights activists—and consequently,
human rights ideas—through the state-run media. 72 National television
outlets and state-run newspapers, which used to censor all references
of human rights lawyers, have launched a coordinated smear campaign
seeking to undermine and discredit the work of human rights lawyers
and activists. Human rights lawyers are now painted as radical and
working as an “organized criminal gang.” 73 Working with
disenfranchised populations (including petitioners, many of whom are
citizen activists) is now cast as subversive; 74 while the use of social
media to call attention to cases of injustice is used as evidence of
sinister intent. 75 In a troubling development, there has been an increase
in the use of (coerced) confessions, 76 either televised on CCTV or
disseminated via social media, as a way of assigning guilt without
trial. 77 Moreover, this propaganda campaign also coopted Chinese
media through the use of televised interviews or interviews with the
amendment/ [https://perma.cc/E9PH-PG49]. For analysis of the newly enacted Heroes and
Martyrs Protection Act, see China Digital Times, New Law Criminalizes slander of Historical
Heroes, (Apr. 28, 2018), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/04/new-law-criminalizes-slanderof-historical-heroes/.
72. See generally Safeguard Defenders, Scripted and Staged: Behind the scenes of China’s
forced TV confessions (2018) (containing extensive analysis and detailed descriptions of the
experiences of human rights activists and the use of state-run media to promote this narrative).
73. Tom Phillips, The Case of Wang Yu, emblem of China’s human rights crackdown,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/
the-case-of-wang-yu-emblem-of-chinas-human-rights-crackdown
[https://perma.cc/TEY4AZ5E].
74. See Chris Buckley, Chinese Authorities Detain and Denounce Rights Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/world/asia/china-arrests-humanrights-lawyers-zhou-shifeng.html.
75 . Sarah Cook, How China’s Crackdown on Lawyers Affects Media Freedom, THE
DIPLOMAT, Aug. 12, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/how-chinas-crackdown-onlawyers-affects-media-freedom/ (“A central focus of the accusations made against the human
rights lawyers has been their use of social media and other online tools to challenge official
versions of events, share images of small-scale protests that then garner wider attention, raise
funds from the public, or build popular support for their clients in an effort to gain judicial
sympathy.”).
76 . See Javier C. Hernandez, China Frees Wang Yu, Human Rights Lawyer, After
Videotaped Confession, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/
world/asia/human-rights-lawyer-is-released-in-china-after-videotaped-confession.html.
77. See generally Safeguard Defenders, supra note 72.
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press 78 —including Hong Kong’s English language paper, the South
China Morning Post 79—as a means of challenging allegations of rights
violations. 80
This demonstrates a concerted effort to move the battleground
away from the intricacies of the legal system and move it into the public
opinion sphere. Broadcasting confessions of human rights activists,
prominent journalists, 81 media influencers, and foreigners 82 serve
several purposes. These confessions, filled with the language of selfcriticism, demonstrate the government’s power over individuals, and
push the message that rights activism threatens national security and
state stability. 83 Using a propaganda machine that is able to reach
hundreds of millions of people, televised confessions also serve to
associate human rights activism with criminality and illegal activities.84
Just as rights lawyers and activists successfully used traditional
and social media platforms to highlight cases and specific causes,
Chinese authorities now use the same platforms to broadcast a different
message. Yet this is not a battle on an equal playing field. Resources
78. Verna Yu & Danny Lee, Published ‘confessions’ stoke fair trial fears for lawyers held
in Chinese crackdown, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (last updated Aug. 4, 2016, 10:47 AMJ),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1841387/published-confessionsstoke-fair-trial-fears-lawyers [https://perma.cc/YC3A-MW8W].
79. The South China Morning Post faced harsh criticism for breaking the story of Zhao
Wei’s confession under suspicious circumstances; journalists and China experts questioned the
veracity of the story, noting that there was no by-line and Zhao Wei had not reached out to her
family at the time of the interview. See Young Chinese legal activist ‘regrets’ civil rights
activism, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 11, 2016, 11:31 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1988501/young-chinese-legalactivist-regrets-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/F2FV-WNGR]; cf. David Bandurski, The Mea
Culpa Machine: Is the South China Morning Post pushing Chinese political ‘confessions’?, H.
K. FREE PRESS (July 16, 2016, 6:29 PM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/16/the-meaculpa-machine-is-the-south-china-morning-post-pushing-chinese-political-confessions/
[https://perma.cc/8Z62-VJWP].
80. See, e.g., Tom Phillips, Bookseller Gui Minhai surfaces in Chinese custody to deliver
staged confession, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018, 9:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/feb/10/bookseller-gui-minhai-surfaces-in-chinese-custody-to-deliver-stagedconfession [https://perma.cc/YPH5-HKM8] (describing Gui Minhai’s interview with the press).
81. See Patrick Boehler, Beijing detains, parades journalist Gao Yu on state TV for
‘leaking state secrets,’ SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 8, 2014, 4:55 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1507195/beijing-detains-parades-journalistgao-yu-state-tv-leaking-state [https://perma.cc/P8ZX-5KXT].
82. See Edward Wong, China Uses Foreigners’ Televised Confessions to Serve Its Own
Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/world/asia/chinaconfession-cctv.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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are now poured into soft power tools to promote positive views about
China with investments by government media but also other
mainstream and digital media outlets, with the goal of presenting an
alternative vision of news reporting that is less in the service of the
citizen, and more in the service of the state. This coordinated campaign
to project positive stories of China includes the creation of a new
broadcast agency “Voice of China” which consolidates state run media
outlets like China Central Television, China Global Television
Network, China National Radio, and China Radio International, and
which will report directly to the Party’s publicity department. 85 The
recent decision to dissolve the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (“SAPPRFT”) and
consolidate regulatory power over news, online content, and film under
the Communist Party publicity department 86 also indicates a shift in the
propaganda campaign. It “signals tighter media control amid a broad
crackdown on news, online content and film that goes against Party
values under President Xi Jinping.” 87
Similarly, reforms in 2017 and 2018 further centralized the
regulatory landscape for social media and Internet platforms, including
increasing the resources available to strengthen the censorship
infrastructure through a central government agency. 88 Changes in
regulations and increased censorship strengthened the Great Firewall,
especially through significant limitations on the use of virtual private
networks (“VPN”) software that allow users to access blocked
information. 89 As part of Xi Jinping’s “cyber sovereignty” campaign,
government regulators required state-run telecommunications firms to
85 . See Pei Li & Christian Shepherd, China tightens grip on media with regulator
reshuffle, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018, 3:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaparliament-media/china-tightens-grip-on-media-with-regulator-reshuffle-idUSKBN1GX0JG
[https://perma.cc/VU5Y-6R5T].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88 . According to reports, the State Computer Network and Information Security
Management Centre (which runs the Great Firewall) is now under the central commission on
internet security headed by Xi Jinping. See Zhou Xin, It’s the mysterious department behind
China’s growing influence across the globe. And it’s getting bigger, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST
(Mar. 21, 2018, 4:37 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2138196/its-mysterious-department-behind-chinas-growing
[https://perma.cc/9KTN-DFNK].
89 . See, e.g., Lucy Hornby, China’s VPN crackdown is about money as much as
censorship, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/35eafc9a-fcf8-11e7-9b32d7d59aace167 [https://perma.cc/XXA3-BF8X].
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use technology to block VPNs and other circumvention tools. 90 The
stakes for challenging dominant state narratives increased—regulations
from the Cyberspace Administration of China released in 2017 now
impose real name registration requirements for users seeking to post
online content or comments, and legal liability for Internet platform
providers who fail to regulate online content. 91
IV. INNOVATION AND MARGINALIZATION: LGBTQ RIGHTS
AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS RE-EXAMINED
The intentional marginalization of rights-focused advocacy by
Chinese authorities and the re-assertion of Party leadership over all
aspects of life, including within the courts, mean that previous political
calculations about rights lawyering and activism must be re-examined.
Although Fu and Cullen noted that “an authoritarian state embraces
weiquan lawyering when it takes on issues that do not threaten the
state’s legitimacy,” 92 it is no longer clear what issues do not pose
threats. We are now at an inflection point—how can right lawyers and
activists best navigate the shifting political lines that determine the
acceptability of (1) what advocacy issues activists can work on; (2) how
they can advocate; and even (3) whom is allowed to speak?
This Section considers how issues like LGBTQ rights and
women’s rights, which were previously perceived as politically
acceptable, are now in an uneasy status vis-à-vis the state. Women’s
rights and LGBTQ rights lawyering offer useful sites of inquiry and
comparison for several reasons. First, LGBTQ issues are intrinsically
connected to issues related to gender and sexuality. Traditional gender
stereotypes serve as impediments both to gender equality as well as
LGBTQ equality because discrimination against individuals on
account of gender roles or for perceived violations of gender norms.93
90. See China Tells Carriers to Block Access to Personal VPNs by February, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (July 10, 2017, 10:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/chinais-said-to-order-carriers-to-bar-personal-vpns-by-february [https://perma.cc/FQY8-NYTY].
91. See 国家互联网信息办公室公布《互联网跟帖评论服务管理规定》[The State
Internet Information Office Promulgates the “Administrative Regulations on Internet Comments
Comments Service”], 国家互联网信息办公 [CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA] (Aug.
25,
2017,
11:45
AM),
http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-08/25/c_1121541481.htm
[https://perma.cc/NGE4-KU9W].
92. Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126.
93. See John Balzano, Toward a Gay-Friendly China?: Legal Implications of Transition
for Gays and Lesbians, 16 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 15 (2007) (explaining the relationship between
gender law and LGBTQ issues).
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Second, though their treatment under the Chinese legal system and
within the Chinese government agencies are markedly different,
activism and lawyering in furtherance of both rights issues used similar
tools with comparable effect. Third, both women’s rights and LGBTQ
rights issues were previously defined as “social issues” that are less
politically sensitive, albeit for different reasons, but recent experiences
demonstrate that the landscape shifted, and therefore is worth reexamining.
A.

Innovation in Legal Grey Areas

As noted above, the mark of political acceptability is one that
allows rights lawyers and activists a modicum of political cover for
their actions. In the case of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights, it is a
double-edged sword. Cast as social issues, they are not typically seen
as core rights like civil and political rights (including freedom of speech
and freedom of religion) and so have not always been taken up by highprofile rights lawyers. Yet, this also means that issues associated with
gender and sexuality were not always readily attacked. For LGBTQ
rights activists, invisibility is a major impediment—both in terms of
invisibility within government policies and data, and invisibility within
Chinese society. 94 Yet, this invisibility may also be protective: activists
posited that LGBTQ rights mobilization is not “intimidating” to the
government because “the population is perceived to be so small in
China.” 95
Women’s rights were traditionally perceived as politically
96
safe —legal and policy advocacy on women’s rights issues like
domestic violence, and even the land rights of rural women, has mostly
been allowed to proceed unimpeded by the Chinese authorities. Not
only does the government hold up gender equality as a central tenet of

94. See Joy L. Chia. LGBTQ Rights in China: Movement-Building in Uncertain Times, in
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Biddulph & Rosenzweig eds., 2018) (forthcoming)
(on file with author).
95. See Timothy Hildebrandt, Same Sex Marriage in China? The strategic promulgation
of a progressive policy and its impact on LGBT activism, 37 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 1313, 1322
(2011) (reporting that “a prominent gay leader reported that when gays and lesbians talk about
human rights the government does not see it as sensitive because the population is perceived to
be so small in China” and “the effect of this group mobilization is not as intimidating to the
government.”).
96. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 22, at 126 (noting that women’s rights were not politically
problematic at the time of writing).
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its political ideology, 97 it has also passed many laws that seek to protect
women’s rights. Most feminist activists believed that working on issues
that reflected the daily lives of many women and which had widespread
public support (for example, employment discrimination, sexual
harassment on public transportation, discrimination in university
admissions), would accord them some semblance of safety and allow
them to avoid government attention and backlash. 98
Chinese courts prove to be relatively welcoming to cases seeking
to protect women and LGBTQ people from discrimination, perhaps due
to the perception that anti-discrimination cases are not politically
sensitive. Since 2013, several cases challenging gender-discriminatory
practices have successfully been brought to court, including China’s
first successful gender discrimination case finding that a Hangzhou city
cooking school violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal employment by
denying her application on account of her gender. 99 A previous case
against a Beijing education institute for refusing to consider a female
college graduate for an administrative assistant job that was advertised
as seeking only male applicants was settled in 2013 for 30,000 yuan.100
In 2015, similar cases were successfully brought against the Beijing
Postal Service (the first such case against a state-owned enterprise) for
the denial of an application because the headquarters did not wish to
hire women as frontline postal workers, 101 and against the blatantly

97. See Joy L. Chia, Legislating Inequalities: Gender, Sexuality and Violence in China, in
GENDER, VIOLENCE AND THE STATE IN ASIA (Amy Barrow & Joy L. Chia eds., 2016).
98. Author’s Notes (Feb. 2015 Interview with feminist activists). See Rachel E. Stern &
Kevin J. O’Brien, “Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and the Chinese State,” Modern
China (Vol. 38), 174-98 (2012) for an important discussion about how people advocating for
change calculate which issues are safer than others to work on, including using government
interest in their favor.
99. See 就业性别歧视第一案胜诉！ [The First Case of Employment Discrimination in
Sex Won!], NGOCN (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.ngocn.net/news/360312.html
[https://perma.cc/6R8K-ZFW5]; Fan Yiying, China Lacks Anti-Discrimination Law with Teeth,
SIXTH TONE (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1772/china-lacks-antidiscrimination-law-with-teeth [https://perma.cc/WTL9-WEGK] (providing detailed analysis of
Chinese anti-discrimination law).
100. See Tania Branigan, China: woman settles in first gender discrimination lawsuit, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2014, 10:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/chinawoman-settles-first-gender-discrimination-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/F92H-CY46].
101. See Woman successfully sues Beijing postal service in gender discrimination case,
CHINA LAB. BULL. (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/woman-successfully-suesbeijing-postal-service-gender-discrimination-case [https://perma.cc/U7EE-4WAU].
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sexist recruitment policies of restaurant refusing to hire women as
chefs. 102
Rights lawyering on LGBTQ issues also increased since 2014,
when Chinese courts accepted the country’s first LGBTQ rightsspecific case. This high profile lawsuit challenged the widespread use
of “treatments” claiming to “cure” homosexuality—in its judgment, the
Beijing court stated that homosexuality is not a disease and therefore
did not need to be treated. 103 In 2016, China’s first same-sex marriage
lawsuit was brought in Changsha, Henan Province; although it was
ultimately unsuccessful, it was remarkable that the case was brought
and then accepted by the court in the first place. 104 In 2017, China’s
first successful case against involuntary hospitalization to undergo
conversion therapy was won, with the Henan court ruling that the gay
man was held against his will and subjected to regular physical abuse
and forced treatment. 105 In December 2016, Mr. C., a transgender man,
won China’s first transgender employment discrimination case after a
Guizhou court ruled he was illegally fired. 106
B.

Marginalization in Shifting Landscapes

Yet, winning in the courts did not necessarily indicate that issues
were politically safe. In one fell swoop, assumptions about the nonsensitivity of issues as anodyne as sexual harassment were proven
wrong on March 6, 2015, when feminist activists were detained two
days before International Women’s Day. Public security officers in at
least three different cities detained more than a dozen young activists
102. See Jonathan Kaiman, In China, feminism is growing – and so is the backlash, THE
L.A. TIMES (June 15 2016, 11:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-chinafeminist-activists-20160614-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q2FU-ARAS].
103. See Dan Levin, Chinese Court Sides With Gay Man in ‘Conversion’ Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec. 19, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/asia/chinese-court-sides-with-gay-managainst-clinic-that-tried-to-convert-him.html.
104. See Tom Philips, China court refuses to allow gay marriage in landmark case, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 1:52 AM), www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/china-courtrefuse-gay-marriage-landmark-case [https://perma.cc/2XQY-AKHW].
105. See Sofia Lotto Persio, LGBT in China: Man Wins Public Apology In Forced Gay
Conversion Therapy Ruling, NEWSWEEK (July 4, 2017, 5:13 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
being-lgbt-china-man-wins-public-apology-forced-gay-conversion-therapy-ruling-631504
[https://perma.cc/7S3G-ECPE].
106 . See Emily Rauhala, Transgender Chinese man wins first-of-its-kind labor
discrimination case, THE WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2017/07/27/transgender-chinese-man-wins-first-of-its-kind-labordiscrimination-case/ [https://perma.cc/5MUK-GPMW].
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in a coordinated crackdown, apparently motivated by an effort to stop
their planned peaceful activities on sexual harassment on public
transportation. Although most were released after several hours of
questioning, the authorities declined to release five young feminists
(now known as the “Feminist Five”) and subjected them to tough
interrogation and harsh treatment. 107 Though they were released after
37 days, in great part due to high-profile domestic and international
campaigns, 108 the chilling effect of the arrests on the feminist
movement was undeniable. Authorities have drawn a clear line
between working with women as a population and working on the
human rights of women.
For LGBTQ activism, the threats have been less overt, but the
consequences of government scrutiny are similar. 109 For example,
domestic NGO regulations do not allow organizations working
explicitly on LGBTQ rights to register with the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, thereby “restrict[ing] the operational capacity of these groups
to raise funds, attract human resources, and provide critical legal,
psychological, and other services.” 110 The passage of the Foreign NGO
Management Law has also impacted LGBTQ groups
disproportionately—for many LGBTQ activists, international funding
is “the lifeblood of their organizations” 111 and foreign funding
restrictions (based on source of funding and intended beneficiaries)
have diverted resources away from LGBTQ rights. 112
107 . See Leta Hong Fincher, China’s Feminist Five, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 2016),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/china-feminist-five [https://perma.cc/Z42G-7CWN].
108. See China releases five women’s rights activists after international outcry DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/china-releases-five-womens-rights-activistsafter-international-outcry/a-18379105 [https://perma.cc/GQT6-QJ5B].
109. This is not to say that LGBTQ activists do not face the threat of government arrest.
In May 2017, 2014, nine people were arrested in relation to a planned seminar on the registration
of LGBTQ NGOs, but all were released within 24 hours. See J. Lester Feder, Nine LGBT
Activists Arrested in China—But Gay Pride March Still Planned, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 9,
2014, 5:59 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/nine-lgbt-activists-arrested-in-chinabut-the-countrys-most?utm_term=.umpKPaEb6d#.ombX7AoxwW [https://perma.cc/M84AGKZD].
110. See CHINA LBT RIGHTS INITIATIVE, SHADOW REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION TO ELIMINATE ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE PRC 4
(Sept. 2014).
111. See Timothy Hildebrandt, Development and Division: the effect of transnational
linkages and local politics on LGBT activism, 21 CHINA J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 845, 845 (2013).
112. See Zheping Huang, NGOs are under threat in China’s latest crackdown against
“foreign forces,” QUARTZ (Jan. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/873489/ngos-are-trying-to-stay-alivein-chinas-latest-crackdown-against-foreign-forces/ [https://perma.cc/47HL-RKHP] (noting the
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The tightening of the media landscape since 2016 also greatly
affected the space for discourse on women’s rights and LGBTQ rights
activism. New regulations released by the Cyberspace Administration
of China in May 2017 increased restrictions on acceptable content on
mass communication and social media platforms, and subjected all
services offered by online news portals and network providers to partysanctioned editorial staff. 113 In June 2017, regulations released by the
China Netcasting Services Association lumped homosexuality together
with sexual abuse and violence under the category of “abnormal sexual
relationships,” and banned all references to homosexuality from online
broadcasting. 114 These changes sparked outrage within the LGBTQ
community with an outpouring of online criticisms; the government
responded by deleting such criticisms with further penalties: in the case
of Li Yinhe, China’s leading sexologist, her critical commentary
resulted in a three-month ban on Weibo. 115
Though discussion of women’s rights issues is generally allowed
by media censors, influential feminist alternative media accounts have
been subject to government censorship and attack. In February 2017,
the social media account of a leading feminist organization, Feminist
Voices, was suspended for 30 days. 116 On March 8, 2018, International
Women’s Day, the account was shut down indefinitely, with its Weibo
and WeChat public accounts (and their archives) deleted. 117 Feminist
Voices had more than 180,000 followers on Weibo and was very
influential among young activist women. 118 The silencing of Feminist
government’s monitoring of Chinese LGBT NGO relationships with international NGOs and
other embassies in China – including pressure to reject funding from US embassy).
113. See Cheng Li & Xinyue Zhang, Online regulations and LGBT rights: A Test for
China’s Legal System, CHINA-US FOCUS (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.chinausfocus.com/
political-social-development/online-regulations-and-lgbt-rights-a-test-for-chinas-legal-system
[https://perma.cc/86KR-4JXY].
114. Jinghua Qian, China’s online multimedia sector bans portrayal of homosexuality,
CHINA FILM INSIDER, (June 30, 2017), http://chinafilminsider.com/chinas-online-multimediasector-bans-portrayal-homosexuality/ [https://perma.cc/9SD8-9MFB].
115. Id.
116. See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Chinese Feminist’s Social Media Account Suspended, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/world/asia/china-feministweibo.html.
117. See Jiayun Feng, Chinese Social Media Censors Feminist Voices, SUPCHINA (Mar.
9, 2018), https://supchina.com/2018/03/09/chinese-social-media-censors-feminist-voices/
[https://perma.cc/C7T4-XEDS].
118. See Wong Lok-to, China Silences Its Feminists on International Women’s Day,
RADIO FREE ASIA (Luisetta Mudie transl.) (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/
china/women-silenced-03092018130214.html [https://perma.cc/W2ZW-83C7].
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Voices mark a new phase of ideological control, demonstrating a shift
in government attitudes (which previously never marked women’s
rights and gender equality as taboo issues 119) to one where feminist
speech and organizing is deemed politically troublesome.
V. CONCLUSION: INNOVATION IN THE MIDST OF
MARGINALIZATION
Xi Jinping’s vision of a rejuvenated China is one that is
characterized by increasing authority in the international sphere (driven
by economic power and a muscular militarism), and a prosperous, wellregulated Chinese society under the CCP’s authoritative leadership.
Having presented its economic miracle as a model for developing
countries, China is now poised to export its governing model, including
the state-sponsored tools of social control, while the PRC government
promotes alternative interpretations of international laws—including
international human rights concepts and international norms of
engagement. China’s assertiveness in the international sphere is
matched by the Chinese authorities’ intolerance of those that disrupt
the singular mythology of Chinese ascendancy.
The government’s reaction to independent, vocal, and wellorganized activists working to expand Chinese society’s ideas of
gender equality and LGBTQ rights likely signals a wariness of the
mobilization power of these two groups; and perhaps a recognition that
such activism at their very core do fundamentally challenge the status
quo. Rights lawyers and advocates working on gender and sexuality are
presented with a conundrum: how to harness social perceptions that
women’s rights and LGBTQ rights are politically non-threatening to
their advantage. As the public space for discourse around the content
of “human rights” and “universal values” constricts, the question for
rights lawyers and activists is one of communications: how to
deconstruct human rights concepts into their most basic ideas with
broad public appeal—to learn how to communicate about ideas of
justice, equality, and dignity in ways that the general public
understands and supports.

119. Id. See Xiao Meili, China’s Feminist Awakening, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/world/asia/china-feminist-weibo.html.

